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6. Success and wealth are bad ethically only insofar as they are
temptations to idleness. .
7. Time is money.
8. He who will not work shall not ~~t. .. _
9. We are each assigned to a position and It IS our duty to per
severe in that position. d
10. Wealth and success do not exempt anyone from the cornman
to labor.
11. We must acquire all we can and save all we ca~. . .
12. The acquisition of wealth is .bad only when It ISWith the pur-
of later living merrily and Without care. " .
*on all of the items of this scale "strongly agree IS the strongest
protestant ethic response.
14 Goldman-Eisler, "Breastfeeding and Charac~er Formation," in C.
Kluckhohn, et al. Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (New
York: Knopf 1953) pp. 146-184.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF DURKHEIM'S
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
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Durkheim and His Critics
Reading Durkheim's critics leads one to conclude that either
Durkheim was very confused or they are. Between them there is
certainly no conscience collective. Some have claimed he was "conserv-
ative" 1 while others deny it;2 his logic has been described as
"fallacious"3 and "incisive"4; he is a "moral philosopher"5 to one
critic and a "great empirical scientist"6 according to another; his use of
"conscience collective" is praised by one writer? and described as
"deplorable"8 by another; he has been characterized as "anti-individ-
ualistic"9 by one critic while another has denied it.' 0
Perhaps the contradictory interpretations result from a real inconsis-
tency in his work. Possibly he cannot be understood because his work is
"out of line with twentieth-century thought. "11 Such explanations,
however, are excessively superficial. What is the basis for the claim that
Durkheim is inconsistent? It seems plausible that his thought is more
complex than is typically realized by scholars. searching it for simple
logical continuities or discontinuities. Perhaps he merely appears
inconsistent because he has been apprehended from diverse points of
view or from a single point of view foreign to his own thought. Many of
his critics have ignored the possibility that Durkheim's ideas were
subject to development (as might surely be expected of any competent
scholar) and that his writings could not thus be expected to agree on
every point.
Moreover, Durkheim's ideas should not be loosely compared with
"twentieth-century thought." Such a comparison both takes Durkheim
out of his temporal context and implies that modern methods are
necessarily "better". If Durkheim had a goal different from that of
modern sociology his method could be expected to be different.
Different scientific ideas and goals are not necessarily wrong ideas and
goals - this assumption would lead to a science both static and
conservative. Or has sociology already become "positive" as
Saint-Simon believed it would?
The Content of Sociological Knowledge
Much sociology today consists of gathering psychological data.
Questionnaires are commonplace, and individual opinions frequently
form the basis for simple generalizations about society. "Status" is
regarded as a sociological term, but is often measured by resorting to
individual opinions.
Durkheim did not believe that such studies form the proper content
of sociological knowledge, particularly as ends-in-themselves. "A
discipline may be' called a science only if it has a definite field to
explore."12 He felt that it is important to segregate sociology from
other fields of study, particularly from psychology and philosophy
which he viewed as threats to the development of sociology as an
independent science. The claim that Durkheim was "anti-individualis-
tic" fails to take this point into account. He was not anti-individualistic
but pro-sociology, and these two positions are not identical. Sociology
must have a clear field of endeavor unhampered by a psychological
point of view and metaphysical speculation. Thus the study of
individual actions is not opposed to the study of the constraints of
society - this does not become a controversy - the former is merely
the domain of psychology and the latter that of sociology. Free will vs.
determinism is likewise not a sociological problem but instead a purely
metaphysical (and philosophical) problem and has no place in the study
of society. 13
Durkheim maintained that the individual is the "basic element of
human groups;"14 but "For sociology, properly speaking, to exist,
there must occur in every society phenomena of which this society is
the specific cause, phenomena which would not exist if this society did
not exist and which are what they are only because this society is
constituted the way it is."15
Durkheim's ideas can be easily misunderstood if the meaning of the
term "society" is taken from context and assumed to be an empirically
defined area.
When Durkheim wrote of "society" he was not considering it in the
modern sociological sense. It did not occur to him to delineate the
"boundaries" of society. The specification of boundaries for society is
an "empiricist" concern, the concern of someone who believes that he
can go out into the real world and draw lines around a section of it
which he can then study as a single unit or "society." Durkheim was
not that naive. Society for Durkheim was that domain in which social
phenomena occur. It is thus theoretically defined according to the
phenomena the sociologist is presently studying. He asks himself under
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what conditions he can expect to find a certain phenomenon and those
conditions define the domain of society. Society thus is not an
empirical area with physical boundaries, but a theoretical domain with
theoretically hypothesized conditions under which it can be empirically
studied.
. Durkheim was no more conservative that he was anti-individualistic.
He.did not claim that the individual must submit to the group and thus
resI~t c~ange. The group has been designated as the proper domain of
sociological study, and the reasons for not studying individuals in order
to understand the group are not moral, but methodological: "The
group thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in which its
~e~~ers would were they isolated. If, then, we begin with the
individual, ,;Ve sha!l .be able to understand nothing that takes place in
the group. 1 6 ThIS IS not to say that every individual must submit to
t~e group but ~ha~ ~oup phenomena should be studied as they are
different from individual phenomena. Nor does this mean that we
should proceed to put aside all data relating to individuals. Durkheim
was concerned at this point with theoretical analysis (not data) and the
starting point for sociology is thus the development of th~oretical
concepts for the phenomena of group activity. The conceptualization
of a "conscience collective" provided such a beginningfor Durkheim in
his study of society.
As characteristics of individuals may be units of analysis for the
psychologist, the conscience collective was a distinctive feature of
sociological analysis. It was not, as has sometimes been claimed a sort
of conscience that dictated the morality of the group. Nor was it as
Parsons described it, "patterns of normative culture that are instituti~n­
alized in the social setting ... in the personalities of its individual
members."17 Parsons' "redefinition in modern terms" reduces con-
science collective to an empirical category. Conscience collective does
not consist of a common culture or values shared by individuals. These
are defined by their empirical existence, while conscience collective is a
theoretical concept, a tool for analysis, a point of view from which to
apprehend social phenomena and thus be able to understand it as more
than a set of unrelated empirical facts. According to Durkheim "the
psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of 'social
phenomena. Since it does not call for one social form rather than
another, it cannot explain any of / them."18 The assumption of
Durkheim's approach is that individual facts do not order themselves.
Thus .they may ~ used as indicators of one or another type of
conscience collectioe but are never equivalent to it.
Because of his use of the conscience collective, Durkheim is
common~y regarded as an early "functionalist" - clearly Parsons
regards himself as part of Durkheim's tradition. Although Durkheim did
frequently use the term "function", he did not think the procedure of
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studying social elements in relation to their consequences was a wise
procedure. He wrote that "the method of explanation generally
followed by sociologists is essentially psychological.... I~ fact, .If
society is only a system of means instituted by men to attain certain
ends, these ends can only be individual, for only individuals could have
existed before society." 19
The conscience collective consequently should not be regarded as
embodying some sort of purpose or end. ~obably Durk~eim w~
actually criticizing the procedures of some of his contemporaries, but It
sometimes seems as if he were anticipating Parsons and Merton. For
example: "We use the word 'function,' in preference to 'end' or
'purpose,' precisely because social phenomena do not gener:uly e~ist for
the useful results they produce.... All these questions of intention are
too subjective to allow of scientific treatment."20 It is certainly very
easy to fall into the tendency to think of Durkheim's conscience
collective in terms-of the modern notion of "function" (as opposed to
"dysfunction") but this is clearly a mistake.
The apparent ambiguity of the conscience collective may, on the
other hand result from the fact that it was never defined in terms of
genus proxtmum and differentia specifica. But, as Carl Hempel has
pointed out, not all scientific terms may be defined in this way.21
Furthermore, conscience collective, as a scientific concept, may not be
defined by any of the conventional or textbook logic modes of
definition. It (like numerous other scientific terms such as "elastic,"
"fissionable," "bureaucratic," and so forth) is a "dispositional" term
which gains its meaning from two sources: (1) its empirical indicators,
and (2) its use in conjunction with other theoretical concepts. Since it
is always possible to locate further indicators for a dispositional term
and always possible to construct further connections with other
theoretical terms, its meaning can never be fully or finally determined.
The recognition of the special nature of dispositional terms is a
relatively recent event in the philosophy of social science.22 Conse-
quently Durkheim's correct use of dispositional concepts more than 36
years earlier is a tribute to his genius. Thus it was not so horrible that
conscience collective was never fully defined - it could not be, for it
was not an empirical category. Instead, as a theoretical concept, it was
indicated by certain empirical phenomena. "Constraint" was, for
example, described as a characteristic of the conscience collective which
influenced the "social facts," but it was intended neither as an
explanation of social phenomena nor the only possible indicator of
conscience collective. But he wrote that he was instead interested in
indicating "by what external signs it is possible to recognize the facts
... in order that the student may know how to detect them and that he
may not confuse them with others. . . . Quite obviously, the social fact
may be characterized in several ways, and there is no reason why any
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one certain distinctive characteristic should be attached to it oftener
than any other. It is only important to choose that characteristic which
appears the best for one's purpose; and it is even quite possible to use
concurrently, several criteria, according to the circumstances."2 3 '
"Institutions" are other such empirical indicators of the conscience
collective:
"It has been pointed out that the word 'institution' well expresses
this special mode of reality, provided that the ordinary significance of it
be slightly extended. One can, indeed, without distorting the meaning
of this expression, designate as 'institutions' all the beliefs and all the
modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity. Sociology can then be
defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their
functioning. "24
Not only is sociology the study of institu tions, but it should assist in
the diagnosis of the social organism to determine whether it is sick or
healthy. "We shall call 'normal' these social conditions that are the
most generally distributed and the others 'morbid' or 'pathologi-
cal.' "25 Perhaps it is because of this unfortunate aspect of Durkheim's
thought that some scholars have been led to believe that he was a"
"moral philosopher"; but Durkheim would not agree. He believed that
the diagnosis of societies was scientific rather than moral. He did not
appear to realize that the belief that solidarity was "normal" was itself
a moral judgment. Nevertheless, since Durkheim was not preaching
morality or seeking to justify a morality, his studies do not suffer from
this type of "functionalism".
Durkheim's Method
Sociology should proceed by the scientific method. Its subject
matter is "institutions." Durkheim's commitment was an unusual one
by today's standards, for his works reflect a continual attempt to apply
scientific methods to sociology. The common approach in sociology
today is to assume that any approach to the subject matter is correct
and scientific as long as we use the proper statistical techniques.
Durkheim was aware that the scientific method was much more than
this, that statistical data are not science, and that an explanation or
theory involvingrelationships between social phenomena was necessary.
His elaboration and codification of his method run throughout his
works, and the reader is always aware that Durkheim is struggling with
the problem of knowledge in social science.
The exposition of his method begins in The Division of Labor in
Society: "Moral facts are phenomena like others; they consist of rules
of action recognizable by certain distinctive characteristics. It must,
then, be possible to observe them, describe them, classify them, and
look for the laws explaining them."26 In this book Durkheim was
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seeking the causes of certain types of solidarity in society: "But we can
know causes scientifically only by the effects that they produce, and in
order to determine their nature, science chooses from these effects only
the most objective and most easily measurable. Science studies heat
through the variations in volume which changes in temperature produce
in bodies, electricity through its physico-chemical effects, force through
movement. Why should social solidarity be any different? "27 This is
clearly not a plea for our modern type of functionalism - it is a clear
statement of Durkheim's conscious understanding of the use of
dispositional terms in the physical sciences.
Furthermore: "Since law reproduces the principal forms of social
solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of law to find
therefrom the different types of social solidarity which correspond to
it. It is now probable that there is a type which symbolizes this special
solidarity of which the division of labor is the cause. That found, it will
suffice, in order to measure the part of the division of labor, to
compare the number of judicial rules which express it to the total
volume of law."28
At this point Durkheim's method consists of: (1) hypothesizing a
connection between a social phenomenon to be examined (division of
labor) and an explanatory concept (solidarity), (2) choosing objective
and measurable empirical indicators (types of law) for that concept, (3)
classifying these indicators by the degree to which they are of a specific
type, and (4) relating the types of the concepts thus measured to the
phenomena he wishes to explain (division of labor).
It is sometimes assumed from statements such as "the essential
properties of a thing are those in which one observes universally
wherever that thing exists and which pertain to it alone,"29 that
Durkheim believed that sociology studies only universal phenomena
which can be found throughout social life. On the contrary, it is not the
universal presence of phenomena which is crucial to Durkheim but the
universal connection of indicators to their concepts which is seen as
essential for their definition.
Much stress is put on Durkheim's description of "social facts" which
should be treated as "things." It appears that some of> the confusion
arising from this is to be found in English translations which render
"faits" as "facts". It is the obvious translation if one considers the
similarity of the words, but the word can legitimately be translated as
"acts" - a much more common meaning of the word in French. Thus
social acts are empirical things which are dependent on the "institu-
tions" of society. Theoretically and conceptually social acts depend on
the conscience collective. This conception makes considerably more
sense in the contexts in which the term was used.
Reading into The Rules of the Sociological Method "act" instead of
"fact" leads to a startling new viewpoint toward Durkheim's thought.
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Consider the new and more dynamic message that the following
translation produces when "acts" are substituted for "facts": "A social
act is every way of action, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the
individual an external constraint, or again, every way of acting which is
general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its
own right independent of its individual manifestations. "30 Here
Durkheim was concerned with distinguishing the special types of acts
which may be considered "social." They are conceptually related to the
conscience collective because that is the defining element which makes
them specifically sociological. They must be considered as "things"
because that is how the scientist proceeds - he considers things
objectively. Objectivity is the quality of "thingness." Thus Durkheim's
commentary on the way in which his concept has been "misinter-
preted" begins to make sense:
"We assert not that social acts are material things but that they are
things by the same right as material things, although they differ from
them in type. . . . To treat acts of a certain order as things is not, then,
to place them in a certain category of reality but to assume a certain
mental attitude toward them as the principle that when approaching
their study we are absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their
characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they
depend, cannot be discovered by even the most careful introspec-
tion."31
This alternative translation also clarifies Durkheim's rejection of
universality as a requirement of sociological study:
"A thought which we find in every individual consciousness, a
movement repeated by all individuals, is not therby a social act."32 It
follows that it is not generalization about the universal, but the
deliberate limitation of the area of investigation by the investigator that
allows us to study sociological phenomena: "the subject matter of
every sociological study should comprise a group of phenomena defined
in advance by certain common external characteristics, and all
phenomena so defined should be included within this group."33
Here the similarity of Durkheim's "social act" to Weber's "social
action" may be recognized. By "common external characteristics"
Durkheim clearly did not mean similar manifestations but fixed
indicators. To take an example from Weber, the social actions of both
those characterized by the protestant ethic and those characterized by
the traditional ethic may be indicated by "common external character-
istics," specifically the relative accumulation of capital. Taking an
example from Durkheim, the social acts of those who are and are not
egoistic may be characterized in an aggregate by differential rates of
suicide. It is through common characterization that individual cases
may be differentiated.
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Table 1. Suicide Based on Conscience Collective
Table 2. Suicide Based on Solidarity
The connection made here is not obvious from Durkheim's discus-
'sion of suicide, but has been made here to clarify more specifically the
place of the study of suicide in his thought. Together with Table 2, it
seems to point out the distinction between anomie and egoistic suicide
which tends to be confused in his work. Table 2 relates fatalistic and
anomie suicide to the types of solidarity found in mechanical and
organic societies, respectively.
Type of Conscience Collective Type of Society
altruistic
egoistic
Type of Suicide
mechanical
organic
"socialism"
"individualism"
Finally Durkheim's specific use of theoretical concepts is notable. He
realized that concepts are necessary elements of science and that
science consists of more than simple generalizing:
"If concepts were only general ideas, they would not enrich
knowledge a great deal, for, as we have already pointed out, the general
contains nothing more than the particular.... Thinking by concepts is
not merely seeking reality on its most general side, but it is projecting a
light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it, and
transforms it."34
Modern sociologists do not appear to find fault with sweeping
generalization - often it becomes a "method" to be religiously adhered
to. Durkheim showed no such faith in his method. He pointed out that
"science rests upon opinions."35 He wished to present a method that
would be useful in generating scientific laws about society. The test of
opinion has rejected his method in the sense that it is neither
understood not used. The question of whether his own use of his
method was successful in achieving his goals remains disputed.
Perhaps it could be claimed here that Durkheim's meanings have
been distorted, but this seems doubtful. In fact, this sort of conceptual
analysis is a distinctive feature of all of Durkheim's work. It is not
likely that his hypothesized types of suicide would be inconsistent with
the rest of his theory and method. It is conceptual analysis that rescues
Durkheim from pure empiricism. The concept of suicide as a social act
is related theoretically to the concepts of mechanical and organic
society through the concepts of solidarity and conscience collective.
Do~s this conceptualization through theoretical connection provide the
basis for the empirical consideration of suicide as a social act? In other
words, can the empirical relations of suicide with other social
phenomena be explained by the proposed theory?
The social act of suicide is considered in relation to the hypothesized
social conditions which, in turn, are measured or indicated empirically.
The logic of this procedure may be diagrammed as follows:
Explanatory Mechanism
. ~SOCIal Level: Psychological level: Social level: .
lack of integration ) egoism ) suicide
(Measured) ~nmeaSUred) .i-> (measured)
Theory~
Suicide as a Social Act
Durkheim's study of suicide has been regarded as the classic example
of an empirical study in sociology. It is thus differentiated from the
earlier studies by Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and others by its empirical
approach. But it is not Durkheim's empiricism that makes this study a
classic - especially since Durkheim regarded pure empiricism as a dead
end. Empiricism, according to Durkheim, is individualized, and, being
so, it results in irrationalism and cannot provide concepts for science.
The "a priorists", on the contrary, assume that the mind has the power
of transcending, experience. These two conceptions are equally futile:
"If reason is only a form of individual experience, it no longer exists,
On the other hand, if the powers which it has are recognized but not
accounted for, it seems to be set outside the confines of nature and
science."36
Durkheim's method is an attempt to be scientific by combining the
empirical with the conceptual. Suicide will be examined here, as an
example of the application of this method.
The measurement of concepts by empirical indicators is an integral
part of their formulation. Durkheim discussed four possible types of
suicide: egoistic, altruistic, anomie, and fatalistic.
Since Durkheim's types of suicide are often confused, perhaps it will
be useful to place them in the context of his other studies. Table 1
relates altruistic and egoistic suicide to the particular types of
conscience collective that are found in mechanical and organic societies,
respectively.
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Type of Solidarity
likeness
difference
(division of labor)
Type of Society
mechanical
organic
Type of Suicide
fatalistic
anomie
One of the indicators Durkheim used for "lack of integration" or
"individualism" was the traditionalistic aspect of religion. The more
traditionalistic (having less room for individual judgment) were expec-
ted to have the lowest suicide rates. The least traditionalistic were
expected to have the highest (egoistic) suicide rates. He coul~ thus
relate the three major religions of Europe, Protestant, Catholic and
Jewish, according to the traditionalistic criterion. He then related
membership in these religious groups to suicide rates and found, ~
expected, that Protestants exhibited a higher suicide rate, the Catholic
rate was lower, and the suicide rate for Jews somewhat lower than for
Catholics.
Durkheim also related his theoretical concept to several other
empirical indicators, lending additional support to his hypothesis. He
measured only two of the concepts of his theory, not egoism. Egoism
here is merely a psychological explanatory device that connects the
terms of his theory; however, if the theory is found to hold, then
egoism could be used as a possible explanation of individual cases.
This type of explanation is rare in modern sociology (although it was
also the method Weber used to analyze the rise of capitalism). It cannot
be understood from the prevalent points of view of modern sociology.
Most critical analyses of Durkheim's method have this fault. The
criticism by Jack Douglas is probably the most careful and comprehen-
sive of these and will thus be used here as an explanatory example.
Douglas very perceptively notices the difference between Durkheim's
theoretical and explanatory levels of meaning, but thought that this was
somehow a fault of Durkheim's method: "the meanings imputed to
. suicide independent of concrete situations in which the communicator
is involved are different from the meanings imputed to concrete
situations in which the communicator is involved. In general terms this
means that the situated meanings are significantly different from the
abstract meanings."3 7
Douglas believes this element of Durkheim's procedure to be· faulty
for two reasons:
1. "It is not possible to predict or explain specific types of social
events, such as suicide, in terms of abstract social meanings, such as
abstract values against suicide. This generalization is a denial of the
fundamental assumption of most general theories of today."38 Here
Douglas, in accordance with the "fundamental assumptions" of modem
sociological theories, equates Durkheim's "abstract social meanings"
with "generalization." As has been seen, this is inconsistent with
Durkheim's method - neither his theory nor its explanation are
intended to "duplicate" reality, for generalization, according to
Durkheim, adds nothing to knowledge. His explanation is conceptually
different from the empirical events to which it refers. He did not intend
to predict from his imputed abstract social meanings - they are merely
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explanatory tools. Prediction is involved at the level labeled "Theory"
in the diagram and is not a consequence of any single concept. Thus
the measurement of integration (through empirical indicators) should
enable the investigator to predict the suicide rate (directly measurable)
which may be explained as a manifestation of egoism. Furthermore
terms such as "egoism" and "fatalism" are not empirical categories (0;
generalizations) but logical constructs of dispositional type.
2. "It is not possible to study situated social meanings (e.g., of
suicide) ... by any means that involve abstracting the communicators
from concrete instances of the social action in which they are
involved."39 Why not? Has Durkheim done the impossible? This
assumption is based on the viewpoint that all scientific abstractions are
merely abstractions from concrete situations. On the contrary, the
application of reason to scientific explanation is usually recognized in
other sciences as a valuable technique. Douglas' criticism here is similar
to Dalton's rejection of the molecular hypothesis, seemingly based on
the assumption that phenomena which are not directly observed do not
exist. But inferences based on molecular theory were quite useful, thus
legitimizing the conceptualization of molecular structure. Interestingly,
later developments in measurement allowed more direct apprehension
of molecular structure. Given some logically equivalent measurement
development, there is some reason to believe that concepts such as
"egoism" may be more directly apprehended in the future.
It is true that Durkheim does not use psychological data to establish
his theory - it is also true that he occasionally uses individual cases as
examples. This is perfectly consistent with his method. Psychological
data cannot lead to sociological explanations; however, once the
sociological explanation has been hypothesized, individual cases may be
explained by it. Suicide rates are predicted by the theory, and
individual cases are to be understood in terms of the explanatory
mechanism (e.g., egoism). Paradoxically, the various psychological cases
that Douglas cites in his book could easily be explained as manifesta-
tions of Durkheim's types of suicide.40
Douglas maintains that "Durkheim bends the data to fit his
preconceived theory. "41 He attempts to demonstrate that this is so by
pointing out that Durkheim's ideas on suicide can be found in some of
the works of his contemporaries. It is true that Durkheim was
influenced by a knowledge of other works on suicide. It is usually
expected of most students of scientific phenomena that they be
acquainted with the other work in the area. Durkheim, in fact,
proposed his theory as a result of such study which led him to
recognize the futility of other explanations. It is clear that such study
had an important influence on his work: his theory was partly a result
of it, and his method was influenced by the mistakes he thought he
found there. Of particular interest is the work of Marselli who relates
185
psychological, physical, cosmic, racial conditions to the incidence of
suicide without offering any theoretical explanation other than the
untempered passions of individuals in the struggle for existence.42 This
explanation may well have led to Durkheim's concept of "egoism,"43
but it is hardly an adequate explanation of the whole of Durkheim's
theoretical meaning. Such a purely psychological explanation contrib-
utes nothing to the prediction of the incidence of suicide which,
according to Durkheim, must be measured in social terms. Marselli
himself recognized the futility of prediction from a psychological
explanation, so he explained that suicide rates were merely a
manifestation of the "law of averages. "44 Durkheim criticized the
notion of averages as an explanation of suicide since the average man
does not commit suicide.45 If it is meant that there is a probability that
a certain number of individuals will kill themselves during a year, this
still tells us nothing of the average inclination to do so.46 The "law of
averages" thus is not an explanation of anything.
The criticism that Durkheim developed his ideas from reading other
works on suicide appears more complimentary than otherwise. If
Douglas' point was that it was somehow wrong of Durkheim to have a
theory before he tested it, it may be true that this violates modern
sociological assumptions; but Durkheim's method is consistent with the
so-called "scientific method" discussed by philosophers of science.
Douglas argues "Besides being out of line with twentieth-century
scientific thought, Durkheim's general theory has the great fault of
being adjustable in such a way as to be irrefutable."47 Is this a fault?
The most useful theories in physical science are precisely those which
may be extended or revised to include new data.
The Road Ahead
If we agree with Durkheim that sociology should be scientific, and if
we agree that it is possible to proceed by means of a "scientific
method" then it is difficult to reject the methods Durkheim used. His
belief that sociology should study the "social" is certainly not
revolutionary, nor is his notion that science consists of more than pure
empiricism or "apriorism."
The basic problem in understanding Durkheim's thought is that we
tend to approach him with our own preconceptions about procedure
and criticize him whenever he veers from the path which we continue
to trample firmly beneath us, unable to follow any other. We cannot
understand his work by simply comparing him with his contemporaries
- he pioneered a path of his own, the intricacies of which are still being
analyzed by philosophers of science. He cannot be understood in terms
of the sociology of today - its "assumptions" block off entrance to a
new level of understanding. He can only be understood in the terms of
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modern philosophy of science. There we find support for his method
and there we also find the basis for questioning the assumptions of
sociology which we have held so long.
The legitimization of Durkheim's method depends on his own
success in using it, since it is not used today. It must be understood in
his own terms. The value of his study of suicide must be determined in
relation to the strength of the relationships tested. A refutation of his
theory would require retesting" in order to determine whether the
theory holds in other cases. Even then, perhaps a rejection of the
theory would be less advisable than a revision.
My own criticism of Durkheim's use of his method in Suicide would
be quite different from Douglas'. After specifying the importance of
theoretical conceptualization, it appeared to me that Durkheim did not
carry it far enough. He left the distinction between egoism and anomie
rather fuzzy. This is not because they are empirically mixed, although
they may be, but because his theoretical formulation of his concepts
was inadequate. He has made this point himself: "Sociologists so
commonly use terms without defining them, neither establishing nor
methodically circumscribing the range of things they intend to discuss,
that they constantly but unconsciously allow a given expression to be
extended from the concept originally or apparently envisaged by it to
other more or less kindred ideas."48 In this instance, Durkheim failed
to rigorously attend to his own advice.
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